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GREENING DEMAND: ENERGY 
CONSUMPTION AND U.S. CLIMATE POLICY 
NOAH M. SACHS† 
ABSTRACT 
The search for greener, less polluting energy supplies has 
dominated discussions of U.S. climate change strategy, but we often 
overlook cheaper and faster greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
achievable through energy efficiency and conservation.  In this article, I 
outline a decade-long “greening demand” agenda to reduce the amount 
of energy consumed in the United States.  The federal government 
should aim to reduce U.S. energy consumption by fifteen percent by 
2016 and twenty percent by 2020 to achieve needed reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
While the United States has achieved notable efficiency gains since 
the 1970s, several market failures and other barriers continue to serve 
as obstacles to energy savings.  These include principal-agent 
divergence, high implicit discount rates used in decision making on 
efficiency upgrades, and outmoded forms of utility regulation.  I 
demonstrate how a greening demand agenda, centered on price signals, 
performance standards, informational tools, and changes in utility 
regulation can be used to overcome these barriers.  Many of the 
challenges are technical and scientific, but law will play a central role in 
structuring incentives and shaping national markets for efficiency 
innovations.  I conclude with some thoughts on the technical and 
political feasibility of greening demand. 
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In the heat of the presidential campaign in the summer of 2008, 
when gasoline sold for over $4.00 a gallon, Americans changed their 
driving and car buying habits.  SUV sales plummeted.1  Amtrak 
ridership was up.2  For a brief time, we had a glimpse of the 
transformation in consumer behavior that could occur in response to 
higher energy prices.  By the time President Obama was inaugurated 
in January 2009, however, gasoline was selling below $1.70 a gallon—
a remarkable, unexpected decline in retail gas prices of more than 
fifty percent in just six months. 
Price volatility is just one of many barriers to achieving long-term 
reductions in energy use in the United States3—reductions that are 
now essential for addressing climate change and improving energy 
security.  Except for moments of public attention to energy 
consumption, as in the late 1970s and the summer of 2008, the United 
States has focused primarily on finding (or militarily defending) 
sources of energy supply.  From the synfuel research program of the 
Carter Administration to today’s interest in new offshore drilling and 
ethanol subsidies,4 we are constantly looking for new cats to chase the 
speedy mouse of American energy demand. 
We can no longer afford, however, to view rising energy demand 
as an exogenous variable—an unquestioned “given” of American life 
 
 1. See Dee-Ann Durbin, SUV and Truck Sales Plunge, WASH. POST, May 2, 2008, at D2 
(reporting dramatic SUV sales decreases at GM, Chrysler, and Ford between April 2007 and 
April 2008, including a thirty-six percent decline at Ford). 
 2. See Bob Dart, Amtrak Ridership Rises Along with Gas Prices, ATLANTA J. CONST., 
May 28, 2008, at E1 (noting that “[r]ising gas prices are contributing to a surge in train travel”); 
Press Release, Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., Amtrak Downeaster and Empire Service Show 
Dramatic Increases in Ridership and Revenue (Nov. 3, 2008), available at http:// 
www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2Copy/News_Release_Page&c
=am2Copy&cid=1178294243600&ssid=180 (noting that fiscal year 2008 marked the sixth 
straight year of ridership gains and saw the highest ridership since 1971). 
 3. In a November 16, 2008 interview with 60 Minutes, President-elect Obama was asked 
whether declining gas prices might reduce the relative priority of energy policy in his 
administration.  Obama answered in the negative and responded: 
We go from shock to trance.  You know, oil prices go up, gas prices at the pump go up, 
everybody goes into a flurry of activity.  And then the prices go back down and 
suddenly we act like it’s not important, and we start, you know filling up our SUVs 
again.  And, as a consequence, we never make any progress.  It’s part of the addiction, 
all right.  That has to be broken.  Now is the time to break it. 
Interview by Steve Croft, Correspondent, 60 Minutes, with Barack Obama, then President-elect 
of the United States, in Chicago, Ill., in Obama on Economic Crisis, Transition, CBS NEWS, 
Nov. 16, 2008, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/16/60minutes/ 
main4607893.shtml. 
 4. See, e.g., VITO A. STAGLIANO, A POLICY OF DISCONTENT: THE MAKING OF A 
NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY, at xiii–xvi (2001). 
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that drives policy decisions on supply.  With urgent concerns about 
climate change and energy security, greening demand now needs to 
become the cornerstone of U.S. energy and environmental policy.  By 
“greening demand,” I mean reducing total annual U.S. energy 
consumption, particularly from fossil fuels.5  To green demand, 
government and the private sector need to promote both energy-
efficient technologies, which can produce the same work with fewer 
energy inputs, and conservation, which means consumers and firms 
must use energy less intensively.6 
The objective of a greening demand agenda under the Obama 
Administration should be a fifteen percent reduction in total U.S. 
energy consumption by 2016 and a twenty percent reduction by 2020.  
These objectives are consistent with needed forty percent reductions 
in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 2030,7 and with President 
Obama’s campaign pledge to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 
to 1990 levels by 2020.8  Achieving any substantial reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions in the near-term depends critically on 
greening demand.  Emissions reductions of fifteen percent or more 
within ten years are unlikely to occur solely through greening supply, 
such as changing the mix of energy sources in the United States. 
 
 5. Currently, about eighty-five percent of the energy consumed in the United States 
comes from fossil fuels, such as oil, coal, and natural gas.  U.S. Department of Energy, Fossil 
Fuels, http://www.energy.gov/energysources/fossilfuels.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). 
 6. The difference between efficiency and conservation can be seen through an example of 
a typical office building.  Efficiency measures would include replacing incandescent light bulbs 
with fluorescent bulbs that provide the same lighting services with far lower energy inputs.  
Conservation measures would include installing motion detectors to ensure that lights are on 
only when people are in a room or increasing natural light to reduce the number of light bulbs 
needed in the first place. 
 7. Climate scientists have stated that global greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced at 
least eighty percent below 1990 levels by 2050 to avoid dangerous climate disruption.  See, e.g., 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, U.S. SCIENTISTS AND ECONOMISTS’ CALL FOR SWIFT AND 
DEEP CUTS IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 5 (2008), available at http:// 
www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/Scientist_Economists_Call_to_Action_fnl.pd
f.  Since the United States is currently emitting about seventeen percent more greenhouse gases 
annually than it did in 1990, see ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2007, at 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/0573(2007).pdf, a forty percent reduction from 
present levels is a reasonable minimum target for the year 2030. 
 8. See BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN: NEW ENERGY FOR AMERICA 1 (2008), available 
at http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_speech_080308.pdf; Jeff Zeleny, Obama 
Proposes Capping Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Making Polluters Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2007, at A24. 
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This article, which contributes to an emerging literature on 
consumption and climate change,9 outlines the energy consumption 
challenge that the United States faces and proposes policy tools that 
the federal government should deploy to overcome longstanding 
barriers to reducing energy demand.  I argue that putting a price on 
carbon emissions through a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system is an 
essential part of a greening demand strategy.  Indeed, pricing carbon 
emissions is the policy change that would achieve the greatest 
economy-wide impact in tempering energy consumption.  However, 
there are also numerous market failures and informational barriers 
that make energy prices a “fuzzy” signal for spurring reductions in 
energy consumption.  These barriers include principal-agent 
divergence of interests, high implicit discount rates used in purchases 
of energy-using products, inadequate information on energy pricing 
and usage by individuals, and a lack of incentives for utilities to 
undertake investments in efficiency measures. 
The persistence of these barriers suggests that we cannot rely 
solely on price signals to drive changes in behavior and consumption 
habits.10  Instead, government needs to play an active role in 
surmounting these barriers through a toolbox approach that would 
include product performance standards, information disclosure 
requirements, and changes in utility regulation.  These approaches 
have proven effective in the past in pollution control policy, and a 
more ambitious greening demand agenda, using this policy toolbox to 
reduce energy consumption, is technically and politically feasible.  
Greening demand offers the prospect of both cost savings and 
environmental improvement, and it is therefore an indispensable 
component of the U.S. climate change strategy. 
 
 9. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change 
and Consumption, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10825 (2008); Symposium, The Next Frontier: Individual 
and Household Environmental Behavior, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 723 (2005); Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as a Regulated Entity in the New Era of 
Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515 (2004); Bradley A. Harsch, Consumerism and 
Environmental Policy: Moving Past Consumer Culture, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 543 (1999); 
CONFRONTING CONSUMPTION (Thomas Princen, Michael F. Maniates & Ken Conca eds., 
2002). 
 10. See AM. PHYSICAL SOC’Y, ENERGY FUTURE, THINK EFFICIENCY: HOW AMERICA 
CAN LOOK WITHIN TO ACHIEVE ENERGY SECURITY AND REDUCE GLOBAL WARMING 24 
(2008), available at http://www.aps.org/energyefficiencyreport/report/aps-energyreport.pdf 
(“[M]arket forces alone cannot drive the adoption of energy-efficiency technologies in a 
beneficially sustained manner within the timeframe imposed by the challenges of global 
warming.”). 
Sachs_Fmt3.doc 7/6/2009  12:26:30 PM 
Spring 2009] GREENING DEMAND 299 
I.  THE CHALLENGE OF U.S. ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
A.  Long-Term Trends 
There are two possible perspectives on long-term trends in U.S. 
energy consumption.  The positive news is that the energy intensity of 
the U.S. economy—the energy needed to produce a dollar of gross 
domestic product (GDP)—has been declining for decades.11  This 
means that the United States has succeeded over time in producing its 
goods and services with fewer energy inputs.  Similarly, the 
greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy—the amount of 
greenhouse gases emitted per dollar of GDP—has also been declining 
for decades.12  These trends reflect policy measures adopted in the 
1970s and 1980s to promote efficiency, as well as a macro-economic 
shift away from heavy manufacturing to information technology and 
service sector jobs that are less energy-intensive.13  President Bush, 
taking advantage of these long-term trends, pledged in 2002 to reduce 
the greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by eighteen percent 
in ten years, and the United States has remained on track to achieve 
that goal.14 
On the other hand, the absolute amount of energy consumed in 
the United States has been rising for decades.  It is the absolute level 
of fossil fuel consumed and greenhouse gases emitted, not the ratio of 
those figures to GDP, which determines the ecological impacts from 
energy consumption.  Total U.S. energy consumption has nearly 
doubled since 1965.15  U.S. consumption of coal for electricity has 
 
 11. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Intensity Indicators in the U.S., 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/ba/pba/intensityindicators/total_energy.html (last visited Mar. 11, 
2009). 
 12. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Trends in U.S. Carbon Intensity and Total 
Greenhouse Gas Intensity (Dec. 2004), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/archive/gg04rpt/ 
trends.html. 
 13. John C. Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus for Greater U.S. Energy 
Consumption, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 15, 32 (2007). 
 14. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, An Empirical Analysis of Energy Intensity and Its Determinants 
at the State Level, 29 ENERGY J. 1, 19 (2008) (concluding that “little policy intervention may be 
required to achieve the Bush Administration’s goal of an 18 percent reduction in carbon 
intensity by the end of this decade”); see also Press Release, The White House, Office of the 
Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Earth Day 2007 (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070420-9.html (noting that “we are well on 
track to meet this [eighteen percent] goal”). 
 15. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2007, at 
38 tbl.2.1(a) (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdf (providing energy 
consumption by sector from 1949–2007). 
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doubled since 1979.16  Annual U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have 
already increased more than ten percent since 1992,17 when the 
United States committed, in the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, to “limit[] its anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases.”18 
On a per capita basis, Americans rank among the highest energy 
consumers on the planet.  With 4.5% of global population, Americans 
annually consume about 22% of the world’s energy supplies.19  
Americans’ per capita energy consumption is about twice as high as 
other industrialized nations, as shown in Table I below.  Our 
enormous consumption habit not only causes climate disruption, but 
also leaves the U.S. economy vulnerable to supply disruptions from 
war, political instability, and peak oil. 
TABLE I – PER CAPITA ENERGY CONSUMPTION, IN MILLION BTUS 
(2006)20 
United States 335 
United Kingdom 162 
Germany 178 
France 181 
Italy 139 
Japan 179 
South Korea 193 
  
  As Table I suggests, we have a severe case of energy bloat in 
the United States.  If there is any upside to this energy profligacy, it is 
that there is enormous untapped potential to reduce both energy 
consumption and associated greenhouse gas emissions in the United 
States.  The embedded “excess” energy in our current industrial, 
 
 16. Id. at 240 tbl.8.5(a) (providing consumption of combustible fuels for electricity by all 
sectors from 1949–2007). 
 17. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 7, at 1 (noting a 10.75% rise in U.S. greenhouse 
gas emissions since 1995 and a 16.7% rise since 1990). 
 18. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 164, art. 4(2)(a). 
 19. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MCKINSEY & CO., WASTED ENERGY: HOW THE U.S. CAN 
REACH ITS ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY POTENTIAL 6 (2007) (providing 2003 figures). 
 20. See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, International Total Primary Energy 
Consumption and Energy Intensity, Per Capita (Per Person) Total Primary Energy 
Consumption (Million Btu Per Person), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ 
international/energyconsumption.html (follow “Most Countries, 1980–2006 for the International 
Energy Annual 2006”). 
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transportation, and residential systems should be viewed as a 
mineable resource.  Indeed, improved efficiency is the “first fuel” the 
United States should turn to for powering its economy in a time of 
deep fiscal constraints and dependence on hostile states for energy 
supplies.21 
Reducing energy demand, however, is among the most neglected 
elements of U.S. environmental policy.  Every president since Nixon 
has rhetorically touted the virtues of energy efficiency, but in practice, 
the federal government has focused primarily on ensuring 
uninterrupted supply.22  The Bush Administration offered a meager 
energy efficiency package in its 2001 energy plan,23 a package that 
focused mainly on public education, fuel savings at federal facilities, 
expanding the Energy Star labeling program, and undertaking further 
studies on efficiency measures.  Just before the plan was released, 
Vice President Cheney famously dismissed energy conservation as a 
mere “personal virtue.”24  Under the Bush Administration, the most 
notable efficiency measures were the 2005 tax credit for hybrid 
vehicles (which was tilted toward benefiting U.S. automakers rather 
than promoting hybrids overall),25 and the 2007 increase in Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles (which 
 
 21. See MAGGIE ELDRIDGE ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., 
REPORT NO. E082, ENERGY EFFICIENCY: THE FIRST FUEL FOR A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE 
(2008), available at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/e082.pdf. 
 22. Federal efforts directly aimed at reducing energy consumption, such as Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy standards first mandated in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 
1975, 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901–19 (2006), and appliance efficiency standards first mandated in the 
National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291–97 (2006), are notable 
exceptions to the dominant focus on energy supply. 
 23. See NAT’L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: RELIABLE, 
AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE 4-11 to -12 
(2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/energy/2001/National-Energy-
Policy.pdf. 
 24. Dick Cheney, Vice President of the United States, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of 
the Associated Press in Toronto, Can. (Apr. 30, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/bb/environment/energy/cheney_4-30.html (declaring that conservation, while “a sign 
of personal virtue,” is “not a sufficient basis for a sound, comprehensive energy policy”). 
 25. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 
30B) (2006).  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 created a consumer tax credit on the first 60,000 
hybrid cars sold by each automaker (with a phase-out of the credit after the 60,000 mark).  
Toyota hit that mark in June 2006, and Honda reached it in late 2007.  The tax credit has 
primarily benefited U.S. automakers producing hybrid models.  See David Leonhardt, U.S. 
Hybrids Get More Miles Per Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2006, at C1 (noting that the credit 
will incentivize consumers to purchase cars such as the Chevrolet Silverado hybrid, which gets 
only sixteen miles per gallon). 
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was less ambitious than fuel economy standards enacted in Europe, 
China, and Japan).26 
The Obama Administration is clearly shifting toward a stronger 
national commitment to energy efficiency and greenhouse gas 
controls.  In May 2009, the Administration reached an agreement 
with automakers and several states that will raise fuel economy 
standards faster than the 2007 legislation requires.27  The economic 
stimulus package signed by President Obama in February 2009 
contained over $20 billion in new funding for energy efficiency 
programs28—far more than any previous American legislation.  This 
commitment toward greening demand needs to be sustained into the 
future. 
The United States now confronts a formidable energy and 
environmental challenge: U.S. energy consumption is projected to 
increase continually through 2030.29  But in the same time period, the 
United States must cut its greenhouse gas emissions at least forty 
percent below current levels—in conjunction with similar reductions 
by other nations—to avoid dangerous climate disruption.30  It is 
unlikely that the United States can thread that needle solely through 
a massive shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy or through 
deployment of carbon capture and sequestration technologies.  
Instead, significant emissions reductions will be achievable only 
 
 26. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102, 121 Stat. 
1498–1499 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 30101) (raising Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
standards from 27.5 mpg to 35 mpg by 2020); see also Andreas Biermann, Int’l Energy Agency, 
Integrating Climate Change and Security Concerns (Feb. 15, 2008), http:// 
www.oecdwash.org/PDFILES/02_15_08_Biermann_Energy.pdf (comparing U.S., European, 
Japanese, and Chinese fuel economy standards). 
 27. E.g., John M. Broder, Obama to Toughen Rules on Emissions and Mileage, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 19, 2009, at A1. 
 28. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(2009).  The stimulus bill included $5 billion in home weatherization assistance, $6.3 billion for 
energy efficiency grants to states and local governments, and $300 million in tax credits for 
purchase of energy-efficient appliances.  See What’s in the Stimulus Bill—A Breakdown: Getting 
to $787 Billion, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 17, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/ 
documents/STIMULUS_FINAL_0217.html; see also Kate Galbraith, Preparing for a Flood of 
Energy Efficiency Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at B1 (outlining how efficiency funds 
might be used by states and municipalities). 
 29. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 
2009, at 109 tbl.A1 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383(2009).pdf 
(projecting total energy consumption to increase by half a percent per year from 2006 until 
2030). 
 30. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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through a shift toward low-carbon sources of energy supply and 
reductions in energy demand. 
B.  Benefits of Greening Demand 
Greening demand should be the cornerstone of U.S. climate 
change policy for several reasons. 
1. Cost 
Measured in terms of initial capital costs or ongoing expenses, 
investments that reduce energy consumption are usually far less 
expensive than building new sources of energy supply.  According to 
the International Energy Agency, an additional $1 spent on more 
efficient electrical equipment, appliances, and buildings avoids, on 
average, $2 in investment in energy supply.31  For planning purposes, 
U.S. government regulators estimate the cost of efficiency 
improvements at three cents per kilowatt hour saved,32 and a widely 
cited 2007 report by McKinsey & Co. identified about a dozen energy 
efficiency improvements in the residential, commercial, and industrial 
sectors that could reduce greenhouse gas emissions at negative 
marginal cost—at a net savings to the economy.33  In contrast, new 
coal-fired plants ordered in 2009 are likely to sell electricity for ten to 
thirteen cents per kilowatt hour, and new nuclear power plants are 
likely to sell electricity for fifteen to twenty-one cents per kilowatt 
hour, based on projected capital costs.34  Efficiency improvements and 
energy conservation are the low-hanging fruit of U.S. greenhouse gas 
reductions. 
 
 31. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MCKINSEY & CO., THE CASE FOR INVESTING IN ENERGY 
PRODUCTIVITY 8 (2008), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/Investing_ 
Energy_Productivity. 
 32. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, DEP’T OF ENERGY, INCREASING COSTS IN 
ELECTRIC MARKETS 14 (2008), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/06-19-08-
cost-electric.pdf. 
 33. JON CREYTS ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE EMISSIONS: 
HOW MUCH AT WHAT COST? U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT MAPPING INITIATIVE, 
EXECUTIVE REPORT, at xiii exhibit B (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/ 
clientservice/ccsi/pdf/US_ghg_final_report.pdf. 
 34. AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NUCLEAR POWER: CLIMATE FIX 
OR FOLLY? 3 (2008), available at http://www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Energy/E09-
01_NuclPwrClimFixFolly1i09.pdf.  The cost differential between efficiency improvements and 
fossil energy sources will be even more pronounced if a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system is 
implemented. 
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2. Speed of Implementation 
Energy efficiency improvements and energy conservation can 
often be implemented faster than bringing new sources of energy 
supply to market.  Efficiency measures do not require lengthy siting, 
permitting, or construction processes.  They also do not require 
construction of new transmission lines, which is one of the major 
current barriers to deployment of large-scale renewable energy 
projects.35 
In contrast, adding carbon-neutral generating capacity, to the 
extent that it would make a substantial difference in overall U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions, is likely to be a slow process extending 
over several decades.  The Energy Information Administration 
projects that U.S. renewable energy generating capacity will increase 
by 1.9% annually through 2030.36  However, absent major policy 
intervention, renewable energy is projected to comprise only about 
twelve percent of total installed capacity in 2030, when coal is still 
projected to be the dominant source of electricity in the United 
States.37  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has received 
applications for twenty-six new reactors,38 but only a handful of these 
new plants will likely be in operation by 2020.  The Electric Power 
Research Institute, the research arm of America’s electric utilities, 
has acknowledged that carbon sequestration from current electric 
power plants will not be practicable before 2020.39  With financing, 
construction, and permitting hurdles on the supply side, near-term 
reductions in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions depend critically on 
substantial reductions in energy demand. 
 
 35. See, e.g., Darrell Blakeway & Carol Brotman White, Tapping the Power of Wind: 
FERC Initiatives to Facilitate Transmission of Wind Power, 26 ENERGY L.J. 393, 393–94 (2005) 
(noting that wind generation faces “stiff obstacles in reaching customers” because wind 
resources are often located far from where the load is needed, requiring substantial investment 
in transmission capacity). 
 36. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 29, at 141 tbl.A16. 
 37. See id. at 128 tbl.A9 (noting that total projected generating capacity in the United 
States in 2030 is 1,123.8 gigawatts, of which 138.2 gigawatts will be in the form of renewable 
generation and 347.9 gigawatts will be in the form of coal-fired power plants). 
 38. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Combined License Applications for New 
Reactors, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).  The 
Energy Information Administration projects that the total installed nuclear capacity in the 
United States will increase by eight percent by 2020, and by twelve percent by 2030.  See 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 29, at 128 tbl.A9. 
 39. See Dallas Kachan, 1990 by 2020?  Forget It, Says EPRI, CLEANTECH GROUP, Apr. 20, 
2007, http://cleantech.com/news/1064/1990-by-2020-forget-it-says-epri. 
Sachs_Fmt3.doc 7/6/2009  12:26:30 PM 
Spring 2009] GREENING DEMAND 305 
3. Conventional Pollutant Reductions 
While current political attention focuses on the nexus between 
energy and climate change, the effects of rising energy consumption 
on conventional pollution should not be ignored.  Nearly forty years 
after enactment of the Clean Air Act,40 over 130 million Americans 
still live in regions that exceed health-based standards for ground-
level ozone—a problem that is largely attributable to vehicle 
emissions and electricity generation (primarily from coal-fired power 
plants).41 
A greening demand agenda for climate change will have 
numerous ancillary benefits for reducing conventional pollution.  The 
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy has estimated, 
for example, that enacting or updating energy efficiency standards for 
fifteen common household and commercial appliances would reduce 
projected 2020 energy demand by fifty-two billion kilowatt hours.42  
This amount is equivalent to avoiding construction of forty 300 
megawatt power plants in the United States.43  And, as we were 
reminded by the devastating coal ash spill near Kingston, Tennessee 
in December 2008,44 the ecological impacts of fossil-based electricity 
production go beyond air pollution.  They include damage to rivers 
and streams, despoliation of public lands, production of toxic wastes 
and mining debris, and mountaintop removal in large swaths of 
Appalachia. 
II.  BARRIERS TO REDUCING ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
Rising energy consumption in the United States since the 1970s 
has been driven by the combination of cheap energy and consumer 
 
 40. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000). 
 41. See U.S. EPA, Air Emission Sources: Nitrogen Oxides, http://www.epa.gov/ 
air/emissions/nox.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (listing vehicles and electricity generation as 
the two largest sources of nitrogen oxide emissions, an ozone precursor); U.S. EPA, Air 
Emission Sources: Volatile Organic Compounds, http://www.epa.gov/air/emissions/voc.htm (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2009) (identifying vehicles as the greatest contributor of VOC emissions, an 
ozone precursor). 
 42. STEVEN NADEL ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. & 
APPLIANCE STANDARDS AWARENESS PROJECT, LEADING THE WAY: CONTINUED 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW STATE APPLIANCE AND EQUIPMENT EFFICIENCY STANDARDS, at 
iv–v (2006) (recommending updated efficiency standards for various appliances such as 
commercial boilers, DVD players and recorders, pool heaters, hot tubs, residential furnaces and 
boilers, and walk-in refrigerators and freezers). 
 43. Id. at v. 
 44. Shaila Dewan, Coal Ash Spill Revives Issue of Its Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, 
at A1. 
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desires for larger homes, bigger cars, and more energy-intensive 
products, such as cell phones, computers, and sixty-inch plasma TVs.45  
As some appliances, such as refrigerators, have become substantially 
more energy-efficient,46 Americans continue to desire new appliances, 
such as large TVs and set-top boxes for digital cable, that consume 
almost as much energy as a refrigerator.47 
A greening demand strategy, therefore, needs to be economy-
wide, rather than focused on particular products.  Putting a price on 
carbon emissions, through a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system, is 
the single most important policy change that would move the United 
States away from wasteful energy consumption habits.  It is also the 
key to spurring new investment in renewable energy supplies.  
Because energy demand is price-elastic,48 a carbon tax or a cap-and-
trade system designed to raise the price of energy and to reflect the 
true costs of environmental damage from our energy system should 
be a central component of the greening demand agenda. 
The optimal design of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems 
has been exhaustively covered in other literature,49 and I do not 
 
 45. See ANDREW FANARA ET AL., HOW SMALL DEVICES ARE HAVING A BIG IMPACT ON 
U.S. UTILITY BILLS, 1, 3 (2006), available at http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/ 
prod_development/downloads/EEDAL-145.pdf (explaining that twenty-eight percent of all 
residential electricity consumption is for miscellaneous electronic devices other than the 
categories traditionally tracked by the Department of Energy, such as lighting and appliances, 
and that this proportion is rising over time). 
 46. See Dernbach, supra note 13, at 19–26. 
 47. See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, TUNING IN TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY: PROSPECTS 
FOR ENERGY SAVINGS IN TELEVISIONS 1 (2006), available at http://www.nrdc.org/air/ 
energy/energyeff/ftv.pdf. 
 48. Economists continue to debate price elasticities for various forms of energy and the 
optimal size of a carbon tax or carbon cap.  For a discussion of how gasoline demand responds 
to price increases, see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING GASOLINE CONSUMPTION: THREE 
POLICY OPTIONS 15–18 (2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/39xx/doc3991/11-21-
GasolineStudy.pdf.  For a discussion of the optimal level of a gasoline tax, see Ian W.H. Parry & 
Kenneth A. Small, Does Britain or the United States Have the Right Gasoline Tax?, 95 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1276 (2005) (concluding that the optimal U.S. gasoline tax, reflecting externalities 
from environmental damage, road congestion, and accidents, is $1.01 per gallon). 
 49. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, Carbon Tax: Ready for Prime Time?, 8 SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. L. & POL’Y 67 (2008); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to 
Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008); William D. Nordhaus, To Tax 
or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming, 1 REV. OF ENVTL. ECON. & 
POL’Y 26 (2007); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN EVALUATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS 
FOR REDUCING U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS (2001), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/28xx/doc2876/CapTrade.pdf.  For an overview of the debate on the merits of carbon 
taxes versus cap-and-trade systems to address climate change, see U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-08-605, CLIMATE CHANGE: EXPERT OPINION ON THE 
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attempt to replicate that debate here.  Rather, my central goal in this 
article is to show that a carbon pricing strategy, while critically 
important, needs to be supplemented with other federal initiatives to 
reduce energy demand.  Price signals, on their own, are unlikely to 
drive sufficient reductions in energy demand because market failures, 
informational constraints, and other barriers often make energy 
prices a fuzzy signal for incentivizing reduced energy consumption by 
individuals and firms.50  These barriers will persist even after 
enactment of a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system puts a price on 
emissions.  Below, I discuss several of these barriers and propose 
policy initiatives to address them. 
A.  Principal-Agent Divergence 
One persistent barrier to improvements in energy efficiency has 
been the divergence of interests between entities making purchase 
decisions for energy-using equipment and the entities paying the 
energy bill.  Purchasers of equipment have little incentive to identify, 
or pay extra for, the most energy-efficient tools and appliances if they 
are not internalizing the long-term operating expenses of their 
choices.  At the same time, the utility bill-paying “principal” often has 
little incentive or opportunity to monitor the choices of the “agent” 
making the initial capital purchase decisions.51 
This divergence can be seen clearly in the example of rental 
housing, where landlords usually choose the major appliances for 
apartments and tenants usually pay the utility bills.  Thirty-two 
percent of American households are rentals, and tenants pay utility 
bills in over eighty percent of these units,52 so the impact of this 
 
ECONOMICS OF POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08605.pdf. 
 50. See Michael Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1755 (2008) (“[N]umerous empirical studies demonstrate that in 
practice, limited information, high transaction costs, and a wide range of behavioral phenomena 
limit the extent to which price alone affects behavior.”); see also Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. 
Stavins, The Energy Paradox and the Diffusion of Conservation Technology, 16 RESOURCE & 
ENERGY ECON. 91, 98–99, 111–19 (1994) (noting market failures for energy-efficient products 
and practices, such as principal-agent divergence and inadequate information, and positing a 
welfare-enhancing role for government interventions to correct those failures). 
 51. See John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1, 5 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. 
Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (“[A]gency loss is the most severe when the interests or values of the 
principal and agent diverge substantially, and information monitoring is costly.”). 
 52. See AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS 
OF MARKET FAILURES IN THE END-USE OF ENERGY 13 fig.1 (2007), available at http:// 
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divergence is far from negligible.  A similar divergence of interests 
can be seen in the market for new homes, where builders make 
essentially all the major decisions about insulation, windows, 
appliances, and other features of the home that affect energy use, 
while home buyers pay the subsequent utility bills.  Even within a 
single firm, it is often the case that major capital equipment is 
purchased by one department whose employees have an incentive to 
minimize up-front costs, whereas the long-term energy cost of that 
equipment is paid by a separate department in the same corporation.53  
As these examples illustrate, energy is often consumed by end-users 
who have little control over the efficiency of the products they use or 
who are shielded, to some extent, from the costs of their energy 
consumption.54 
 
B.  Information and Search Costs 
A second barrier to adoption of energy-efficient products and 
practices is that identifying areas for energy savings can involve 
substantial information and search costs.55  To reduce energy 
consumption, firms and consumers need to understand their own 
energy usage habits, alternative available technologies, and the 
amount of energy and money that might be saved through a switch to 
an alternative product or behavior.  These comparisons often require 
a level of technical expertise and knowledge of energy pricing beyond 
the grasp of most consumers.  Moreover, the search costs of obtaining 
the relevant information may be greater than the dollar value of 
potential savings. 
 
www.aceee.org/Energy/IEAmarketbarriers.pdf (noting that there were 33.6 million rental 
households in the United States in 2003, and that in approximately 29.2 million of those 
households the tenants paid the utility bills). 
 53. See Stephen J. DeCanio, Barriers within Firms to Energy-Efficient Investments, 21 
ENERGY POL’Y 906, 908 (1993) (“Within the framework of decentralized corporations, 
multidivisional structures or government bureaucracies, individual maximization can produce 
results contrary to the formal goals of the organization.  A wide variety of circumstances can 
lead to a failure of the organization to maximize profits or minimize costs, even though the 
individual agents are fully rational wealth maximizers.”). 
 54. See, e.g., SCOTT MURTISHAW & JAYANT SATHAYE, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE 
BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., QUANTIFYING THE EFFECT OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM ON 
U.S. RESIDENTIAL ENERGY USE 2–4 (2006), available at http://ies.lbl.gov/iespubs/59773Rev.pdf. 
 55. See Richard A. Posner, Hayek, Law, and Cognition, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 147, 163 
(2005) (“The gallon of gasoline for which I pay $1.75 may be selling for $1.50 a block away, yet 
if I and other consumers do not know this, the disparity in price may persist.  The existence of 
search costs and other information costs is now an established feature of rational-choice 
economics . . . .”). 
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In the residential sector, a related problem is that most 
consumers cannot calculate how much electricity or natural gas any 
one item in their home or apartment uses,56 nor do they usually know 
their real-time energy use in the residence, given current metering 
practices.  Consumers therefore have little incentive to absorb the 
information and search costs to find alternative products or to cut 
back on energy usage.  With our current system of electricity and 
natural gas metering, we are like diners at a restaurant with no prices 
on the menu.  We may be shocked by the bill at the end of the dinner, 
but without item-specific price information, we will leave the 
restaurant unsure about how to order differently next time. 
C.  High Discount Rates 
Economists have documented that purchasers of cars, appliances, 
lighting, and electronics employ a high implicit discount rate, ranging 
from 25% to 300%, with respect to future savings from energy 
efficiency.57  Such discount rates mean that consumers have a very low 
sensitivity to the prospect of a reduction in energy bills even a year or 
two into the future.  Consumers instead have a laser-like focus on the 
initial purchase price of equipment and tend to heavily, and 
irrationally, discount future savings in operational costs, demanding 
rates of return from energy efficiency that widely exceed market 
interest rates.  Literature in behavioral economics suggests that this 
deviation from predicted rationality results from aversion to present 
losses and consumer difficulty in trading off present and future losses 
and gains.58  Whatever the roots of the behavior, the implicit use of 
high discount rates is an important barrier to more widespread 
adoption of energy-efficient technologies in the retail market.59  
 
 56. The National Research Council, noting that most consumers lack awareness about their 
levels of residential energy use and the sources of their energy supply, has referred to this 
phenomenon as “energy invisibility.”  See COMM. ON BEHAVIORAL & SOC. ASPECTS OF 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION & PROD., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY USE: THE HUMAN 
DIMENSION 36–42 (Paul C. Stern & Elliot Aronson eds., 1984). 
 57. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 
40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 384 (2002). 
 58. See, e.g., George Lowenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 
J. ECON. PERSP. 181 (1989). 
 59. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 50, at 1734 (“Consumers’ extremely high discount 
rates for long-term savings from one-time purchases tend to serve as a barrier . . . to 
economically favorable investments in energy-saving devices.”).  For a review of research in the 
behavioral sciences on consumption habits and environmental decision making, see PANEL ON 
SOC. & BEHAVIORAL SCI. RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR ENVTL. DECISION MAKING, NAT’L 
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Moreover, economists have documented similar trends in the 
corporate sector when managers make decisions on energy efficiency 
investments.60 
D.  Utility Incentives 
The rate structures of electric and natural gas utilities serve as yet 
another barrier to the adoption of energy-efficient products and 
practices.  Retail rates are generally set by cost-of-service regulation, 
in which regulators set rates to compensate utilities for their capital 
costs and a set profit margin,61 or through regional wholesale markets.  
In either setting, the more energy that utilities supply to end-users, 
the more revenue utilities earn, and there is therefore little incentive 
for utilities to undertake programs to reduce energy demand.  They 
are in the business of selling megawatts, not negawatts.62 
As a result of this rate structure, firms that are best positioned to 
promote conservation and efficiency (because they have an 
established business relationship with millions of building owners)63 
are indifferent, or even hostile, to the task.  To be sure, American 
electric utilities have implemented programs aimed at reducing 
energy consumption, particularly during peak hours,64 but through the 
1980s and 1990s, such programs remained tangential to the core 
business objectives of utilities.  In 2004, spending by American 
 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 78–81 (Garry D. Brewer & Paul C. Stern eds., 2005). 
 60. See DeCanio, supra note 53, at 908 (noting the prevalence of high internal “hurdle 
rates,” which widely exceed prevailing costs of capital, used by managers when considering 
investment decisions); see also SOREN T. ANDERSON & RICHARD G. NEWELL, RESOURCES 
FOR THE FUTURE, INFORMATION PROGRAMS FOR TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: THE CASE OF 
ENERGY-EFFICIENCY AUDITS 4–5 (2002), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-
02-58.pdf (finding a sixty-five to eighty-five percent hurdle rate in a study of efficiency 
investments made by small and medium-sized firms, implying that managers demand a 1.25- to 
1.5-year payback on efficiency investments). 
 61. See NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, ALIGNING UTILITY INCENTIVES 
WITH INVESTMENTS IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 2-3 to -4 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
cleanenergy/documents/incentives.pdf. 
 62. See PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM: CREATING THE NEXT 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 279 (1999) (defining negawatts as “electricity saved by reducing 
inefficiencies in its use”). 
 63. See Edward Comer, Transforming the Role of Energy Efficiency, 23 NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV’T 34, 35 (2008) (“Electric companies maintain the key supporting infrastructures (e.g., 
rates, metering, billing), which are essential for the delivery, verification, and pricing of many 
efficiency services.”). 
 64. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1054 (2d ed. 2006). 
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electric utilities on energy efficiency programs was a paltry five 
dollars per capita.65  Utilities continue to invest in relatively low-
return sources of energy supply while ignoring opportunities for 
efficiency investments that offer far higher rates of return.  In the past 
decade, however, over a dozen states have passed “decoupling” 
legislation that separates utility revenues from provision of energy, 
and there has been an expansion of state legislation promoting energy 
efficiency in the utility sector through mandates and performance 
targets.66  These trends need to be encouraged to align the private 
interests of utilities with the public interest in reducing energy 
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. 
III.  GREENING DEMAND: A TOOLBOX APPROACH 
As a result of the barriers discussed above, private investment in 
energy-efficient technology and practices is far less than the socially 
optimal level of investment.  Individual ignorance (not knowing) or 
inaction (not bothering) about energy consumption results, 
collectively, in a national energy appetite that contributes to climate 
disruption and leaves the United States dangerously exposed to 
energy supply shocks. 
President Obama has committed to working with Congress to 
enact cap-and-trade legislation for greenhouse gas emissions.67  
Beyond this critical policy of putting a price on emissions, there are 
hundreds of policy measures—from subsidies, to tax credits, to direct 
regulation and government R&D—that could potentially be deployed 
to promote reductions in energy demand.  When land use and long-
term transportation changes are included in the mix, the policy 
options to reduce energy demand expand even further.  This article 
does not provide detailed policy recommendations for all the various 
energy use sectors (i.e., residential, industrial, and commercial 
buildings; automobiles, aviation, and other transportation; industrial 
 
 65. MAGGIE ELDRIDGE ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., 
REPORT NO. E075, THE STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD FOR 2006, at 7 (2007), 
available at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/e075.htm. 
 66. MAGGIE ELDRIDGE ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., 
REPORT NO. E086, THE 2008 STATE ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD 16–18 (2008), available 
at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/e086.htm. 
 67. Remarks on the Federal Budget, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 00108, at 2 (Feb. 26, 
2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900108.pdf; see also 
Steven Mufson, Push to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Would Put a Price on Emitting Pollution, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2009, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/12/AR2009031203318.html. 
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process equipment; consumer electronics and appliances; etc.).  Such 
comprehensive recommendations have been provided elsewhere,68 
and may very well require a book-length treatment. 
Rather, my purpose here is to emphasize the feasibility of 
achieving substantial reductions in energy demand through 
implementing a toolbox approach that draws on diverse policy 
instruments.  These instruments should include performance 
standards, information provision, and changes in utility regulation, 
and should be designed to counteract the barriers to reducing energy 
consumption discussed above. 
A.  Efficiency Performance Standards 
Performance standards directly address the issues of principal-
agent divergence, high discount rates, and informational barriers by 
establishing targets for the efficiency of energy-using products.  
Performance standards aimed at energy efficiency would specify the 
level of energy use or energy efficiency that must be obtained, while 
leaving flexibility for manufacturers to determine how to hit that 
target.69  Examples of performance standards would include building 
codes that mandate minimum energy efficiency requirements for new 
construction and energy efficiency standards for new appliances.70 
Building codes specifying energy efficiency requirements have 
been used by various states for decades (California enacted the first 
in 1978).71  While the federal government is unlikely to enact a 
 
 68. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY POLICY, ENDING THE ENERGY STALEMATE: A 
BIPARTISAN STRATEGY TO MEET AMERICA’S ENERGY CHALLENGES 37 (2004), available at 
http://www.energycommission.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/1088 (outlining energy efficiency 
recommendations); AM. PHYSICAL SOC’Y, supra note 10; MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 
19; AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., WINNING THE OIL ENDGAME: INNOVATION FOR PROFITS, JOBS, 
AND SECURITY 43–102 (2005). 
 69. See David M. Dreisen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: 
Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
289, 297–98 (1998) (explaining that performance standards do not require the use of any 
particular technique to achieve the standard). 
 70. See John Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption: Legal 
and Policy Tools for Efficiency and Conservation, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10016–17 (2007) 
[hereinafter Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing] (discussing the history of CAFE 
standards and appliance efficiency standards in the United States and detailing associated 
energy savings). 
 71. For a list of states that have implemented building codes with minimum energy 
efficiency requirements, see U.S. DOE, Building Energy Codes—Status of State Energy Codes, 
http://www.energycodes.gov/implement/state_codes/index.stm (last visited May 3, 2009).  
California’s energy efficiency requirements for new construction are found at CAL. CODE REGS. 
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national building code, the February 2009 stimulus bill tied energy 
efficiency block grants to the states to certifications by governors that 
the states will implement energy-efficient building codes72—a measure 
that should help to promote greener building practices nationally. 
With respect to appliances, the Obama Administration should 
resuscitate the existing program of appliance efficiency standards, 
which was neglected under prior administrations.  By statute,73 the 
Department of Energy (DOE) was obligated to issue thirty-four 
minimum efficiency standards for twenty different consumer product 
and industrial equipment categories.  It missed the deadline for every 
category.74  In a 2006 settlement of litigation brought by fifteen states, 
DOE committed to completing all necessary rulemakings by 2011.75  
The Department needs adequate staff and resources to meet that 
deadline and lock in gains in appliance efficiency that likely would 
not be achievable through market forces alone.  The appliances 
covered by these rulemakings—such as air conditioners, furnaces, and 
clothes dryers—account for about thirty percent of total U.S. energy 
usage.76 
An emerging problem is skyrocketing energy consumption for 
consumer electronics that are not covered by any efficiency 
performance standard, such as televisions, cell phones, video game 
players, and other media devices.  This is the fastest-growing segment 
 
tit. 24, pt. 6, available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-400-2008-001/CEC-
400-2008-001-CMF.PDF (amended code to take effect Aug. 1, 2009). 
 72. See American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 410(a)(2), 
123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 73. See National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-12, 101 Stat. 
103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291–97, 6299, 6302, 6303, 6305, 6306, 6308 & 6309 
(2000)) (establishing rule-making requirements for twelve appliances); see also Energy Policy 
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in Titles 15, 16, 38, and 42 of the U.S. 
Code) (adding rule-making requirements for twelve additional appliances).  Rule-making 
requirements for sixteen additional appliances were added in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 135, 119 Stat. 594. 
 74. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-07-42, ENERGY EFFICIENCY: LONG-
STANDING PROBLEMS WITH DOE’S PROGRAM FOR SETTING EFFICIENCY STANDARDS 
CONTINUE TO RESULT IN FORGONE ENERGY SAVINGS 1 (2007).  The missed deadlines resulted 
in foregone energy savings of at least $28 billion.  Id. at 11. 
 75. See Press Release, Office of the N.Y. Attorney Gen., Federal Energy Dept. to Improve 
Appliance Efficiency: States Achieve Major Energy Conservation Agreement with Feds (Nov. 
13, 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/pr111306a.pdf. 
 76. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 74, at 1. 
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of household energy consumption.77  The International Energy 
Agency recently projected that the global growth in energy use for 
these products through 2030 will be equivalent to all of the current 
residential electricity consumption in the United States and Japan 
combined.78  While governments have started to address the disposal 
impacts of electronic products once they are in the waste stream,79 
there has been comparatively little governmental action to address 
the climate impacts of these same products resulting from their 
energy consumption.  Efficiency performance standards for consumer 
electronics should be strongly considered to counteract this projected 
leap in energy consumption. 
One drawback of performance standards is that they generally 
apply only to new products, and therefore contribute only 
incremental changes to the efficiency of the existing capital stock.  
Performance standards make a difference over many years as capital 
stock turns over and more products on the market are subject to the 
standards.  This is why performance standards should be 
implemented as a supplement to energy price signals, which have a 
more immediate effect on the operating costs of all products in the 
marketplace. 
B.  Information Provision 
To help counteract the problem of search and information costs, 
the federal government should expand existing product labeling 
programs aimed at energy efficiency, such as Energy Star.  The 
Energy Star program, the most successful eco-labeling program in the 
United States,80 applies to consumer products in over fifty categories.81  
The Energy Star label is awarded to products that are typically ten to 
 
 77. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GADGETS AND GIGAWATTS: POLICIES FOR ENERGY 
EFFICIENT ELECTRONICS 21 (2009), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/ 
Gigawatts2009SUM.pdf. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer 
Responsibility in the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51 (2006) 
(comparing the approaches of the European Union and the United States regarding the 
management of electronics waste). 
 80. See, e.g., Abhijit Banerjee & Barry D. Solomon, Eco-labeling for Energy Efficiency and 
Sustainability: A Meta-Evaluation of U.S. Programs, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 109 (2003) (assessing 
private and government-run eco-labeling programs targeting energy efficiency and concluding 
that government support is crucial for the credibility, financial support, and long-term viability 
of the programs). 
 81. See Energy Star, Energy Star Qualified Products, http://www.energystar.gov/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=find_a_product. (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
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twenty-five percent more efficient than applicable minimum 
requirements.82  Energy Star labels visually highlight potential savings 
and help consumers choose among competing products.  DOE 
estimates that in 2007 alone, the program reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions by the equivalent of taking 27 million vehicles off the 
road.83  Additional funding is needed, both to expand Energy Star to 
other product categories84 and to ensure that Energy Star ratings are 
accurate and reflect the latest testing techniques.  A 2008 
investigation by Consumer Reports found wide discrepancies 
between claimed energy consumption on Energy Star labels and 
actual energy consumption when the product is put into use.85 
A second area in which information provision could reduce 
energy consumption is real time pricing (RTP) for electricity.  RTP 
involves the use of “smart-meters” that would allow end-users of 
electricity to see their actual electricity use at any given hour of the 
day, as well as the current price of electricity.  RTP could make end-
users as sensitive to electricity prices as drivers are to short-term 
fluctuations in gas prices—prices that are displayed in huge numbers 
at every gas station.86  However, RTP must be implemented in the 
context of consumer education campaigns and traditional demand 
response programs of utilities, such as technology rebates, to win 
customer acceptance.87  If expanded successfully beyond initial pilot 
programs, RTP would solve several problems at once.  It would not 
only help to reduce energy consumption, but it would also reduce 
stress on the electric grid during peak periods and reduce the need for 
new generating plants.88 
 
 82. See Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing, supra note 70, at 10016. 
 83. Energy Star, About Energy Star, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm? 
c=about.ab_index (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
 84. Funding for Energy Star was flat under the Bush Administration, at around $48 million 
per year.  President Bush’s last budget request, for Fiscal Year 2009, cut Energy Star funding by 
$4 million, or almost ten percent.  See STEVEN NADEL, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-
EFFICIENT ECON., FEDERAL ENERGY-EFFICIENCY BUDGET AND ENERGY-EFFICIENCY TAX 
INCENTIVES 8 (2008), available at http://files.eesi.org/Nadel_2.14.08.pdf. 
 85. Energy Star Has Lost Some Luster, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2008, at 24. 
 86. See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 765, 814 (2008) (advocating real-time pricing and arguing that “[m]arket designers need to 
enhance demand response by letting retail customers see, and respond to, the effects of very 
short-term price changes”) (emphasis omitted). 
 87. See GALEN BARBOSE ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., A SURVEY OF 
UTILITY EXPERIENCE WITH REAL TIME PRICING, at ES-9 (2004), available at http:// 
repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2733&context=lbnl. 
 88. See Comer, supra note 63, at 34–35. 
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C.  Changing Utility Regulation 
To promote major reductions in energy consumption, the federal 
government should closely examine lessons from utility regulation in 
California, which rewards investments in energy efficiency.  In 1982, 
California was the first state to enact utility decoupling legislation.  In 
a 2007 expansion of the program, the California Public Utilities 
Commission adopted a “shared savings” model, in which the state 
adopts energy savings targets, and utilities are then entitled to 
between nine and twelve percent of the verified net savings 
(depending on whether they come close to, or exceed, the targets), 
potentially up to $450 million over a two year period.89  The model 
allows California utilities to earn substantial return from reductions in 
energy consumption, reversing and upending some of the basic 
assumptions of traditional utility regulation.  California’s original 
decoupling legislation and the subsequent commitment of state 
government to achieve energy efficiency gains help to explain why 
per capita electricity consumption in California has remained 
constant for thirty years, while per capita electricity consumption in 
the rest of the United States has increased by fifty percent in the same 
time period.90 
The federal government needs to tread carefully in expanding 
utility incentive programs nationally.  Shared savings models are 
already in place in six states91 and should not be preempted.  
Moreover, utility rate regulation has traditionally been a state, rather 
than a federal, function, and the Tenth Amendment would preclude 
federal legislation directing states to change their existing rate 
regulation practices to reward efficiency.92  Rather than a national 
program of utility rate regulation, the Obama Administration and 
 
 89. See id. at 36 (outlining shared savings models in California, Arizona, and Ohio); see 
also JIYONG EOM, SHAREHOLDER INCENTIVES FOR UTILITY-BASED ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA 5–6 (2008), available at http://www.iaee.org/en/students/ 
best_papers/Jiyong_Eom.pdf (describing the goals of California’s shared savings model). 
 90. AM. PHYSICAL SOC’Y, supra note 10, at 23; CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2007 
INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT 3 (2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
2007publications/CEC-100-2007-008/CEC-100-2007-008-CTF.PDF. 
 91. See NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, supra note 61, at 6-1 tbl.6-1. 
 92. The Tenth Amendment prohibits “commandeering” state or local government to 
effectuate a federal regulatory program.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
(striking down a portion of the Low Level Waste Policy Act requiring states to take title to 
radioactive waste not disposed of prior to 1996, and upholding provisions involving financial 
rewards from the federal government); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking 
down a portion of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring state and local 
officials to conduct background checks on gun purchasers). 
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Congress should provide grants and technical assistance to states to 
implement rate structures that reward efficiency gains, promoting 
state experimentation in this area.93 
IV.  CONCLUSION—IS GREENING DEMAND FEASIBLE? 
Substantial reductions in energy consumption should be a central 
focus of U.S. climate change policy.  Greening U.S. energy demand 
offers the prospect of greenhouse gas reductions, conventional 
pollutant reductions, reduced dependence on foreign energy supplies, 
a lower trade deficit, and cost savings.  A fifteen percent reduction in 
total energy consumption by 2016 and a twenty percent reduction by 
2020 are the minimum targets that the Obama Administration should 
set. 
Are such substantial national reductions feasible?  Technical 
analyses strongly suggest that they are.  A 2007 report by McKinsey 
& Co. found that realistic efficiency gains in just three sectors 
(buildings, appliances, and industrial facilities) could offset almost all 
of the projected increase in national electricity demand by 2030, and 
notably, could almost offset the need for new coal-fired power 
plants.94  The same report concluded that a “widespread and sustained 
national commitment” on energy efficiency and renewable energy 
could reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions twenty-eight percent 
below 2005 levels by 2030.95  California and several other U.S. states 
are already demonstrating that high standards of living can be 
achieved with far lower energy consumption than the U.S. average.  
According to a recent study by the Rocky Mountain Institute, if forty 
U.S. states could match the top ten U.S. states on electricity 
productivity, national electricity consumption would drop 
approximately thirty percent.96  And because of the 2008–2009 
 
 93. The February 2009 stimulus bill provides, somewhat cryptically, that energy efficiency 
block grants to states are conditioned, in part, on state regulatory authorities implementing 
“cost recovery for prudent investments by utilities in energy efficiency” and an “earnings 
opportunity for utilities associated with cost-effective energy efficiency savings.”  American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 410(a)(1), 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 94. JON CREYTS ET AL., supra note 33, at xv. 
 95. See id. at xii, 19 (noting that twenty-eight percent emissions reductions are possible 
under McKinsey’s “high-range” greenhouse gas abatement scenario and that achieving the high-
range of abatement would require “aggressive, simultaneous, successful actions across all 
sectors and geographies fueled by a sense of great urgency”). 
 96. See NATALIE MIMS ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., ASSESSING THE ELECTRIC 
PRODUCTIVITY GAP AND THE U.S. EFFICIENCY OPPORTUNITY 6 (2009), available at http:// 
ert.rmi.org/files/documents/CGU.RMI.pdf.  Electricity productivity refers to dollars of GDP 
divided by kilowatt hours consumed.  Id. 
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recession, near-term reductions in energy demand are expected even 
without significant policy intervention.97 
The real question is whether a long-term national greening 
demand agenda, led by the federal government, is politically feasible.  
As John Dernbach has noted, Americans simultaneously follow two 
contrasting story lines on energy consumption.  On the one hand, 
they equate energy consumption with affluence and reductions in 
consumption with “a form of martyrdom or impoverishment.”98  
“Energy conservation” is a negative term for many Americans, 
bringing to mind images of President Carter in his cardigan sweater 
by the fire, imploring them to turn down the thermostat and make 
“modest sacrifices” to save energy.99  On the other hand, a new 
storyline has evolved over the past few years (and particularly during 
the presidential campaign), in which energy efficiency means 
achieving more with less waste.100  It means financial opportunities, 
improved competitiveness, and green jobs. 
The challenge for President Obama is to frame the long-term 
effort to reduce U.S. energy consumption in terms of this second 
narrative, connecting a greening demand strategy with jobs, 
opportunity, national security, environmental improvement, and 
growth in GDP.  The President should stress that we have made 
remarkable gains in energy productivity since the 1970s,101 and that 
the nation needs to increase those gains so that the absolute amount 
of fossil fuel energy consumed in the United States declines.  With the 
 
 97. See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SHORT-TERM ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 4 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/forecasting/steo/oldsteos/jan09.pdf 
(reporting a 5.7% decrease in daily U.S. petroleum consumption in 2008 compared to the 2007 
average); see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. CARBON DIOXIDE 
EMISSIONS FROM ENERGY SOURCES: 2008 FLASH ESTIMATE 2, 15 (2009), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/flash/pdf/flash.pdf. (reporting a 2.8% decline in CO2 emissions 
from all fossil fuels and a 6% decline in CO2 emissions from petroleum between 2007 and 2008, 
attributed to higher oil prices and to declining economic activity at the end of 2008). 
 98. Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing, supra note 70, at 10004. 
 99. See Videotape: President Jimmy Carter, Report to the American People on Energy 
(Feb. 2, 1977) (Miller Ctr. of Pub. Affairs, Univ. of Va.), available at http://millercenter.org/ 
scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3396. 
 100. For examples of candidate statements on energy efficiency and green jobs during the 
presidential campaign, see BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN: NEW ENERGY FOR AMERICA, 
supra note 8, at 3–4 (discussing the job-creation potential of proposed energy efficiency 
policies); JOBS FOR AMERICA: THE MCCAIN ECONOMIC PLAN 8–10 (2008), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/4296859/John-McCains-Jobs-for-America (discussing transportation 
and building efficiency programs as a component of McCain’s proposed job creation plan). 
 101. For example, by 2003, the U.S. was wringing twice as much GDP out of each barrel of 
oil used, as compared to 1975.  See LOVINS ET AL., supra note 68, at 43. 
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prospect of cost savings and job creation from energy efficiency 
investments, there may be a governing coalition to implement the 
greening demand agenda.  That coalition needs to be skillfully 
assembled.  The future of U.S. climate strategy depends on it. 
 
